Anthropogenic climate change poses an existential threat to life on Earth, hastening the need to generate support for sustainability policies. Four preregistered studies (total N = 2,524) tested whether informing United States citizens about the successful implementation of sustainability policies abroad increased support for similar domestic policies. Studies 1 and 2 found that learning about the successful implementation of sustainability policies (reducing automobile use, using wind energy) abroad increased (1) support for similar domestic policies, (2) intentions to modify behavior to facilitate the adoption of sustainability policies, and (3) behavioral support for sustainability policies. Study 3 found that learning about sustainability policies in both WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) (France) and non-WEIRD (Colombia) countries increased support for similar domestic policies. Study 4 found that learning about sustainability policies abroad increased support for domestic policy proposals that would impact participants’ city of residence. Overall, these findings suggest that educating citizens about the implementation of sustainability policies abroad can bolster support for domestic policies that combat climate change.

The Dark Triad is a constellation of related traits that capture subclinical aversive predispositions. The present research tested whether the Dark Triad predicts ideological poking, defined as the public display of products aimed at insulting political opponents. Study 1 (N = 299) indicated that psychopathy (but not Machiavellianism or narcissism) predicted ideological poking. Study 2 (N = 200) replicated this effect and specified further that psychopathy was associated with ideological poking around both ingroup and outgroup audiences. These results suggest that the Dark Triad, in particular psychopathy, may contribute to political polarization via its connection to extreme forms of political expression.

Current interventions to reduce political animosity focus on helping opposing partisans find common ground. But asking people to acknowledge agreement with political adversaries can provoke discomfort and resistance. Five preregistered studies (N = 8,215) explore an alternative approach. We find that asking US-based partisans to write about areas of disagreement with their political ingroup (vs. areas of agreement with their outgroup) can be similarly effective for reducing outgroup animosity compared to control, but ingroup disagreement meets less resistance. Studies 1-3 document that the ingroup disagreement task reduces outgroup animosity across multiple behavioral and attitudinal measures without inducing ingroup dislike. Study 4 finds that participants prefer the ingroup disagreement task across numerous dimensions and choose it directly. Study 5 is a randomized field experiment showing that people sign up for and complete an exercise soliciting ingroup disagreement 44% more often than an outgroup agreement equivalent. Harnessing ingroup disagreement may help dampen outgroup animosity.

In America’s polarized political climate, consumers not only favor their own side—they dislike the opposing party and view it as a threat to their values and way of life. Reflecting this climate, political candidates and brands increasingly offer products that insult political opponents. The present research (total N = 1,210) asks two fundamental questions: what motivates consumers to choose to display products with messages that mock opponents, and how do viewers react? Drawing on realistic conflict theory and benign violation theory, we argue that consumers display products that use humor to insult opponents not merely to antagonize the other side but to bring their own group closer together. Moreover, we contend that allies exposed to such messages perceive greater unity within their own political group than allies exposed to messages that criticize opponents without humor. Highlighting the danger posed by political opponents can boost ingroup unity—but if the threat feels too strong, it can backfire. Humor helps make the threat of the outgroup feel more manageable. Five studies (four preregistered) support these ideas. Politically offensive products may be a strategic tool for building solidarity with allies.

How much blame do leaders deserve for counterfactual catastrophes: disasters that could have occurred under their watch but never did? We propose that when people oppose (vs. support) a leader, they are more likely to answer this question by considering how close the catastrophe came to occurring. In two preregistered experiments (total N = 1,927), U.S. participants assigned greater blame for counterfactual catastrophes (e.g., an imagined nuclear attack) to Presidents Trump and Biden when these catastrophes were framed as having been close to occurring rather than distant – but especially when judging the president they opposed (vs. supported). The results reveal a novel way in which counterfactual thinking facilitates motivated moral reasoning. Wanting to condemn a leader may decrease people’s focus on how a catastrophe never occurred and increase their focus on how it nearly occurred. We discuss how imagination can fuel political polarization.